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In the SupreiDe Court of the 
State of Utah 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPO-
RATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
' \ 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE 
NO. 8282 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellant, on its brief, has made a, preliminary 
statement which we believe eontains some statements of 
facts which are without support in the evidence, and some 
facts are there omitted which we deem material. What is 
said under paragraph 1, Wholesale, and under 2, Retail, on 
pages 1 and 2 of appellant's brief may be true, but much 
of what is there said is without support in the evidence. 
In light of the fact that there is considerable evidence 
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omitted, some of which is without confli,ct, we have deemed 
it advisable to make a brief summary of the evidence rather 
than to attempt to merely supplement the statements made 
in appellant's brief. 
(Note: Throughout this brief we shall refer rto mat-
ters found in the judgment roll by the letter R followed by 
the page of the record where the same occurs, and ~we shall 
refer to the evidence in the transcript of the evidence by 
the letters Tr followed by the page of the transcript where 
the same occurs.) 
Plaintiff is and at all times here involved was a bank-
ing corporation doing business as such at Provo, Utah Coun-
ty, Utah. Defendant. corporation is and at all times here 
involved was a corporation engaged in the business of fi-
nancing retail dealers in automobiles. Harry Parsley, Inc. 
is and at all times here involved was a corporation with an 
agency for selling new Mercury and Lincoln automobiles 
at Provo, Utah. It also dealt in buying and selling used 
automobiles of various kinds. Prior to October, 1952, the 
Harry Parsley, Inc. was being financed by the Commercial 
Credit Corporation (Tr. 5). .A!bout October 2, 1952, the 
defendant took over the financing of the Harry Parsley, 
Inc. (Tr. 7). The personal defendants were at all times 
here invoJved either officers or agents of the defendant cor-
poration. The defendant Frank Nichols, whose true name 
is Francis J. Nichols, was the special sales representative 
of the defendant corporation (Tr. 209). The defendant W. 
W. Wilkinson was, during the time involved in this contro-
versy, the operating manager of the defendant corporation 
and engaged in overseeing rthe operation of wholesale and 
credits and personnel of five branches, the same being at 
Seattle, Boise, Idaho Falls, Ogden and Salt Lake City (Tr. 
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245). From the time the defendant corporation took over 
the financing of Harry Parsley Corporation about the first 
of October, 1952, to December 23, 1952, this practice of do-
ing business was followed: 
From time to time Harry Parsley, Inc. would draw a 
sight draft on the defendant corporation and receive there-
for immediate credit at the plaintiff bank (Tr. 4). The 
sight draft was on the outside of an envelope in the follow-
ing form: 
"Please seal this envelope 
CIT 
Universal Sight Draft 
City State Date 195 
At sight 
Pay to The Order of $ ___ _ 
the sum of ollars 
To Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation 
45 East 3rd South 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
____________ ........,,ealer 
_________________ Title 
Payable through First Security Bank of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
31-1-1240" 
See plaintiff's Exhibit I. 
The blanks were properly filled out by the one who 
drew the sight draft. In this case by the Harry Parsley, 
Inc. When the sight drafts were so drawn they were taken 
to the plaintiff bank, which gave Harry Parsley, Inc. im-
mediate credit in his account at the bank for the full amount 
of the draft. Contained in the envelope upon which the 
drafts were printed there was placed an invoice and con-
tract of sale, together with a eheek made payable to the 
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defendant corporation for the amount of ·the draft 'Contained 
on the outside of the envelope. The invoice and contract 
of sale -contained a des:eription of the automobile involved 
in the transaction, the amount for which sold, the amount 
of the sales tax, if any, the down payment and such other 
information as was necessary to inform the drawer of the 
draft the nature of the transaction. (See plaintiff's Ex-
hibit A, B_, C, D, E, F, G, H and I.) 
WhiLe neither the plaintiff bank nor the defendant cor-
poration approved the method of the bank giving immediate 
credit :for the amount of the sight drafts drawn by the Pars-
ley corpocation, it was agreed that such practice would be 
and it was followed until December 23, 1952 (Tr. 9). 
On December 23, 1952, the defendant Nichols called 
J. Hamilton Calder, Vice-President and ~Cashier, of the plain-
tiff bank on long distance telephone and asked Mr. Calder 
if the bank was extending credit to the Parsley Company; 
Mr. Calder stated that they were not extending any credit 
to that eompany, but merely served as a depository. In 
that ~conversation, Mr. Calder asked Mr. Nichols what the 
record showed as to the financial standing of the Parsley 
Company, and was informed by Mr. Nichols that a recent 
statement submitted to the defendant company showed a 
net profit of $90,000.00 and while he was somewhat over-
extended and short on working capital, they were of the 
opinion that he was sound. Mr. Nichels further stated that 
he would be in Provo at the end of the week and would call 
at the bank (Tr. 10). That during October (1952) the bank 
handled about $100,000.00 in business with the Parsley Cor· 
poration; in November about $160,000.00; in December 
about $102,000.00 and in January, 1953, about $55,000.00 
(Tr. 10). This business consisted of accepting sight drafts 
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drawn by the Parsley ~corporation for immediate credit, ex-
cept some of the drafts drawn in January, 1953, which were 
not honored by the defendant company; that there was. no 
difficulty about the matter of giving immediate credit to the 
Parsley corporation until January 6, 1953. The custom fol-
lowed by the plaintiff bank during this period was to credit 
the Parsley account with the face of the sight drafts by post-
ing the same on the day after the sight drafts were deliv-
ered to the bank, but to make the credit for the drafts as 
of the date the same were actually left with the bank (Tr. 
11). That the envelopes upon which the drafts were drawn 
were not opened because the bank was not authorized to 
open the same (Tr. 12). 
Mr. Oalder testified that on December 24, 1952, he 
and Mr. Nichols had a conversation in which Mr. Nichols 
wanted to know for what kind of drafts the bank had been 
giving immediate ~credit; that Mr. NichoJs stated that his 
company (defendant) had set a limit on the wholesale floor-
ing or wholesale financing of used cars for Harry Parsley, 
Inc. which had increased its inventory to a point where he 
had exceeded their limit (Tr. 13). We quote the follorwing 
from Mr. Calder's testimony: 
"Mr. Nichols had said that we had presented some 
$32,000.00 of wholesale financing which at that time 
consisted of ·drafts which were up for payment in their 
office. I informed him at that time that Parsley had a 
sizeable stock of used cars and that his stock appeared 
to be in pretty good condition, and that it appears as 
though he would be able to work off the excess stock 
in the period of some sixty days. At that time he said 
they didn't want to handle any more financing of used 
cars and for us not to accept any more drafts, and I 
assured him that we would nort. I said 'By the way, how 
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do we determine whether the draft is wholesale or re-
tail financing?' and his reply was 'Wholesale financing 
drafts are for even amounts and generally in excess of 
$3000.00.' And that terminated the conversation. I 
asked him how to determine whether a draft was whole-
sale or retail, and the reason I asked the question is 
the. drafts didn't reveal on its face anything as to its 
character. My understanding was in even sums of 
$1000.00 Qr in round figures (Tr. 14) like $6000.00-
$8000.00 or $10,000.00, whereas a retail sum had a fig-
ure in every digit, dollars and cents." (Tr. 15) 
It may be well at this point to direct the attention of 
the Court to the testimony offered by the defendant as to 
this conversation. 
Defendant (Frank Nichols) Francis J. Nichols gave this 
version of the conversation had with Mr. Calder on Decem-
ber 24, 1952: 
"I told Mr. Calder that we no longer would 1handle 
-·honor sight drafts covering items of wholesale finan-
cing. Mr. Calder asked me if we would continue to 
handle retail as we had in the past, and I said 'Yes'. 
He then asked me how he could distinguish an item of 
wholesale and an item of retail, and my reply was that 
normally items of wholesale would be in larger amounts 
than retail. However the only way that you could ac-
tually ten whether it was wholesale or retail items was 
to open the drafts. His reply to that was he didn't 
know if he should. That was all." 
That during that conversation no mention was made 
to Mr. Calder about even amounts of $3000.00 or more (Tr. 
210). That in a conversation had on December 23, 1952, 
he told Mr. Calder that he felt Harry Parsley, Inc. had an 
unusually heavy used car inventory and that he felt it should 
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be reduced. He further told Mr. Calder that he had a re-
cent financial statement of the Parsley -company which 
showed a net earning of $90 some odd thousand dollars as 
of that time (Tr. 211). Returning to a recital of Mr. Cal-
der's testimony, he further testified that: 
"On January 5 and 6, 1953-, thirteen sight drafts 
drawn on the defendant corporation for the total sum 
of $29,223.65 were presented to the plaintiff bank by 
the Parsley corporation and credit given to the Parsley 
account on January 6, 1953. These drafts were sent 
to plaintiff's correspondent bank, Walker Bank and 
Trust ·Company on January 7, 1953 and presented for 
payment through the First Security Bank of Utah on 
January 8, 1953. All of these drafts were dishonored 
and payment refused. The drafts were returned to the 
plaintiff bank which received the same on January 10, 
1953." (Tr. 24) 
Mr. Calder further testified that he assumed all of the 
drafts were retail within the definition given to him by Mr. 
Nichols and that when the drafts were dishonored and re-
turned no reason was given for the same being dishonored 
(Tr. 27). 
Mr. Calder further testified that he had a conversation 
over long distance telephone with Mr. McConnell, a clerk 
in the Salt Lake office of the defendant corporation, on Jan-
uary 6, 1953. That Mr McConnell stated that the plaintiff 
bank was not to give immediate credit thereafter to Harry 
Parsley, Inc. on its drafts. That the defendant corporation 
would honor drafts that were taken up to the close of busi-
ness on January 6. 1953 and that thereafter they would not 
honor any drafts until defendant corporation gave plaintiff 
bank direct authorization; that Mr. McConnell further stated 
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that the defendant corporation had about $44,000.00 of 
checks of the Parsley corporation (Tr. 51). That at the 
time of this .conversation Mr. Calder believed the Parsley 
corporation had been given credit for the drafts, or a part 
of the drafts. 
Mr. Calder further testified that on ·the morning of 
January 7, 1953, Mr. McConnell and Mr. Sperry ·called at 
the bank and a conversation was had by them and Mr. Bird 
and the witness (Tr. 52). That the conversation was had in 
the directors' room of the plaintiff bank. That they first 
talked aJbout the experience of Mr. Parsley of the Parsley 
corporation in connection with the automobile business; 
that Messrs. M·cConnell and Sperry stated that Mr. Parsley 
had come highly recommended and had been successful in 
the business of selling automobiles (Tr. 5·3). That the Pars-
ley corporation had too large an inventory Which was caus-
ing it financial distress; that the defendant company would 
accept all sigbt drafts that were in process of clearance, 
but would not accept any other drafts signed by Harry Pars-
ley, Inc. That Messrs. McConnell and Sperry knew that 
drafts of the Parsley company were in process of ·clearance 
at the time of this conversation, because the matter was 
discussed (Tr. 54). Mr. Calder further testified that if it 
had not been for the promise made that the drafts would 
be paid, the ~checks drawn against the credit given for the 
drafts would not have been paid (Tr. 56). 
Mr. Calder further testified that he had a conversation 
with Mr. McElhany, an officer of the defendant corpora-
tion, on January 8, 1953. On that day, Mr. McElhany pre-
~ent~d to the plaintiff bank for payment a large number 
of checks drawn on the bank by the Parsley corporation 
(Tr. 56). That when the checks were presented to the tel-
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ler he referred them to Mr. Calder. That when Mr. Cal-
der was asked to honor the checks he toJd Mr. McElhany 
that Mr. Parsley had ordered payment stopped on all checks 
in excess of $300.00; that Mr. McElhany wanted to know 
if he, Calder, realized the payment of some $30,000.00 in 
drafts hinged on the decision of plaintiff bank as to whether 
or not it would honor for cash the checks drawn by the 
Parsley corporation and held by defendant corporation; that 
Mr. Calder replied that he knew the situation to be critical 
and he wanted the attorney for the bank to pass on the 
question; that when counsel for the bank came to the bank 
he informed Mr. McElhany that the bank was obligated to 
follow the instructions of the Parsley corporation; that as 
Mr. McElhany started to leave the bank Mr. C'alder told 
him (McElhany) that he, (Calder) would try to get Mr. 
Parsley to rescind the order stopping payment of cheeks if 
the defendant corporation would honor the drafts that had 
been credited to the account of the Parsley corporation. 
That upon the conclusion of this conversation, Mr. McEl-
hany left the plaintiff bank ·and about an hour later plain-
tiff bank received word by telephone from its correspondent 
bank in Salt Lake City that the drafts here involved had 
been dishonored and were being returned (Tr. 58-59'). 
Mr. Calder further testified that on January 10, 1953, 
Mr. Nichols and Mr. Sperry came to the plaintiff bank and 
when informed that Messrs. Bird and Calder were disap-
pointed because the drafts were dishonored, Messrs. Nich-
ols and Sperry stated that the drafts were returned for a 
reason that they were not prepared to discuss (Tr. 59). 
Messrs. Nichols and Sperry also stated that the Harry Pars-
ley, Inc. was out of trust to the extent of $50,000.00 and 
that the defendant corporation had received an assignment 
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of its reserve account and a bill of sale on its used cars. 
Victor J. Bird, Vice-President of the plaintiff bank, 
testified that he had a conversation with Mr. McConnell 
and Mr. Sperry on January 7, 1953, at the -cashier's desk 
of the plaintiff bank. That Mr. Calder was ·also present. 
That in such conversation. Messrs. McConnell and Sperry 
assured Messrs. Calder and Bird that the drafts here in-
volved would be honored and paid by the defendant corpor-
ation (Tr. 173). He further testified that on January 7, 
1953, Mr. Wilkinson came to the bank after it was closed 
and in a conversation there had, Mr. Wilkinson stated that 
he noti-ced on his desk that morning a large number of drafts 
and that he ordered th~ drafts to be paid (Tr. 176-177). 
Mr. Bird further testified that the checks drawn against 
the credit given the Parsley corporation were paid in re-
liance upon the promises of the officers ·and agent of the 
defendant corporation that the drafts here involved would 
be honored and paid (Tr. 193). Mr. Bird further testified 
that the bank had up to the close of business on Jan. 7, 1953, 
to dishonor and return the checks drawn by the Parsley 
corporation in favor of the defendant corporation against 
the credit given for the sight drafts. That except for such 
promises the checks would not have been paid (Tr. 194). 
Clyde B. Sperry, a witness called by the defendants, 
in part testified as follows: That he was the local branch 
manager of the defendant corporation at Salt Lake City 
from October, 1952, to the end of January, 1953; that he 
called at the plaintiff bank before noon on January 7, 1953, 
at which time he had a conversation with Mr. Calder and 
Mr. Bird (Tr. 225-226). That on that occasion he asked 
Mr. Calder if he would be able to certify to one check pay-
able to the defendant corporation and drawn by the Pars-
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ley corporation. That Mr. Calder said he would not certify 
to the check; that upon informing Mr. ~der that there 
were other checks issued to the defendant eorporation by 
the Parsley corporation that were not paid, Mr. Calder sta-
ted that the plaintiff bank would not pay the same (Tr. 
227). Mr. Sperry testified that the defendant coJl)oration 
had purchased the four draft items 10, 11, 12 and 13 from 
the Parsley corporation by giving that corporation credit 
for the same on its account (Tr. 229). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Sperry testified that the 
four drafts that the defendant corporation purchased from 
the Parsley corporation were four of the drafts that the 
defendant ·corporation had refused to honor (Tr. 230). 
That Mr. Wilkinson told the witness that the sight drafts 
were opened by the defendant corporation on J·anuary 8th 
(Tr. 231). That at the time of the conversation, the de-
fendant corporation had a number of checks issued by the 
Parsley corporation, but the check had not been held for 
some time (Tr. 233). There was received in evidence five 
checks marked Defendant's Exhibit No. 7. These were 
checks that had been presented to the plaintiff bank and 
payment refused (Tr. 238). That the Parsley corporation 
was handling Lincoln and Mercury new automobiles; that 
new Mercury automobiles sell at various amounts from 
$2400.00 to $3200.00 or $3300.00, depending on the equip-
ment. 
Woodrow A. Wilkinson was ·called as a witness by the 
defendant corporation, and in part testified as follows: 
That during October, November and December of 1952, 
and January of 1953, he was the operating manager of the 
defendant corporation in charge of the Seattle, Boise, Idaho 
Falls, Ogden and Salt Lake City branches (Tr. 245). That 
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on January 7, 1953, he was at Provo and had with him a 
number of checks payable to the defendant corporation that 
had been returned; that he saw Mr. Bird about 4:30 on that 
day (Tr. 246). That the only conversation had with Mr. 
Bird was about the checks; that he saw the drafts involved 
in this controversy on the morning of January 7 before he 
went to Provo (Tr. 247). That he examined the sight drafts 
on January 7, 1953, at the request of Mr. McElhany (Tr. 
248); that he ordered the drafts returned to the bank. That 
plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, C. D, E. F. G, H, and I represent 
wholesale transactions (Tr. 249); that he knew in the fore-
part of January, 1953, that there was an arrangement by 
and between the plaintiff and the defendant covporation 
whereby immediate credit was to be given to the Parsley 
corporation for items of retail financing, but not for whole-
sale finan;cing. 
'f,hat the items 10, 11, 12 and 13 on plaintiff's Exhibit 
J represent retail financing (Tr. 250). That the witness 
returned all of .the drafts because instructed to do so by his 
boss, Mr. McElhany; that the drafts were returned early 
on the morning of the 8th, which was after he had been to 
Provo (Tr. 251). That the plaintiff bank refu·sed to pay 
the checks which the witness presented for payment on the 
7th and on the next day the drafts were dishonored and re-
turned to the plaintiff bank; that .he did not tell Mr. Bird 
on the afternoon of January 7, 1953, that he had noticed 
a large number of drafts amounting to $29,223 and some 
odd cents on the desk of a clerk in the Salt Lake City of-
fice and that he had ordered them paid; that he knew the 
drafts were there (Tr. 252); that Mr. McElhany called the 
witness from Provo on January 8th; that Mr. McElhany 
was at Provo with a handful of checks (Tr. 253); that part 
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of the checks that Mr. McElhany had were the checks that 
the witness had the day before; that Mr. McElhany had 
additional checks; that the witness did not know that a large 
number of checks that plaintiff corporation had paid were 
paid out of the credit given for the sight drafts that were 
dishonored (Tr. 254). He further testified that one cannot 
tell from the draft whether it is for a wholesale or a retail 
transaction; that the only way to tell would be to open the 
envelope upon which the draft is printed; that it is not the 
custom to open envelopes containing drafts (Tr. 255). 
G. H. McElhany was called as a witness by the defend-
ants, and in part testified as follows: That he resides at 
Seattle, Washington, and is a vice-president of defendant 
corporation; that during the years 19'52 and 1953 he was 
supervisor and solicitor of business; that he supervised the 
handling of credit (Tr. 256); that he ~came to Provo on Jan-
uary 8, 1953, where he met Mr. Calder; that he had with 
him a number of checks which he presented to the teller 
of the plaintiff bank; that the bank refused to pay the 
checks because of insufficient funds (Tr. 257); that the total 
amount of the checks was $22,000.00 or $23,000.00. When 
the checks were presented Mr. Calder stated that there 
were not sufficient funds to pay the same and that the bank 
could not pay any of the checks because payment had been 
stopped on all checks in excess of $300.00 (Tr. 258) . That 
Mr. Calder wanted to call his attorney, Mr. Morgan, and 
the witness stepped out of the bank with Mr. Nichols and 
called Mr. Wilkinson at the office of defendant corporation 
in Salt Lake City (Tr. 259); that Mr. Wilkinson stated that 
some of the drafts that the defendant ~corporation held were 
wholesale and some were retail (Tr. 260); that the witness 
told Mr. Wilkinson to refuse payment on all of the drafts;· 
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that after the telephone conversation with Mr. Wilkinson the 
witness went back in the plaintiff bank; that he told Mr. 
Calder "that it was time we took a long look at that entire 
matter, and that I would stop payment on these drafts; 
that they all could be paid at a later date, but they were 
being stopped now and returned. In fact they can be paid 
now." (Tr. 262) 
On cross-examination he testified "that he was nervous 
about it, yes. Mr. Wilkinson told me that there was checks 
to be returned and I had a handful of checks about $23,000.-
00 worth, yes, several thousand dollars worth and the bank 
would not cash the checks"; that "I believe as I recall, it 
was two years ago, I told him I was going to stop payment 
on the drafts"; that after he had stopped payment on those 
drafts he came back to the :bank and urged the bank to pay 
the checks he had (Tr. 263). That he told Mr. Calder he 
was going to stop payment on the drafts; that he knew at 
that ti~me there were drafts in the office at Salt Lake, but 
did not know that the bank had given the Parsley corpo-
ration credit for the same; that he knew the sight drafts 
at Salt Lake City amounted to about $29,000.00 because 
Wilkinson told him (Tr. 264); that he knew the drafts were 
not paid by defendant corporation; that the defendant cor-
poration was holding $22,000.00 or $23,000.00 in checks of 
. the Parsley -corporation (Tr. 265) ; that he knew that ar-
rangements had been made for retail and not wholesale 
financing in connection with the Parsley corporation (Tr. 
266). 
These facts are establi·shed without any dispute: 
The plaintiff on January 6, 1953, received 13 sight 
drafts drawn by the Parsley corporation on the defendant 
corporation. These drafts were credited to the account of 
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the Parsley corporation as of Janaury 6, 1953, although the 
actual posting off the credit was not made until January 
7th. The total amount of the sight drafts for whieh the 
Parsley eoDporation was given immediate credit was $29,-
223.65 (Tr. 16). It was so found by the trial court (R. 67). 
No attack is made upon such finding. That during the lat-
ter part of December, 1952, and the forepart of January, 
1953, Harry Parsley, Inc. drew a large number of checks 
in the total sum of in excess of $30,000.00, which checks 
were drawn on the plaintiff in favor of the defendant cor-
poration (Tr. 264), and Plaintiff's Exhibits X, CC, EE, FF, 
GG, DD, AA, Z, Y ·and 'Defendant's Exhibits 6 and 7. It 
was so found by the trial court, and no attack is made upon 
such finding (R. 67). 
That in addition to the immediate credit given to the 
Parsley ·corporation for the sum of $29,223.65, for the sight 
drafts drawn on the defendant corporation, the Parsley eor-
poration had other credits in its account in the sum of $7,-
792.57 which offset against the $29,223.65, making a bal-
ance of $21~431.08 in checks that were drawn by the Pars-
ley corporation in favor of the defendant corporation and 
paid to rthe defendant corporation out of the credit given 
to the Parsley corporation for the sight drafts that were 
dishonored and returned to the plaintiff (Tr. 34). The trial 
court so found. (See Finding No. 17, R. 70) 
Neither the plaintiff nor its agents opened the envel-
opes upon which the sight drafts were written at or prior 
to the time they were mailed to the plaintiff's correspondent 
bank at Salt Lake City to be presented to defendant cor-
poration for payment (Tr. 12 and 219). There is a conflict 
in the evidence as to whether or not the envelopes contain-
ing the drafts were opened by the defendant corporation 
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before they were returned to the plaintiff, or whethe·r the 
envelopes were first opened after they were returned to the 
plaintiff (Tr. 19 and 247). · 
That the District Court Rules of the Fourth Judicial 
Distri·ct Court of Utah County for Setting of Cases for Trial 
which were in effect at the times here involved contain, 
among others, the following provisions: 
"6. Civil causes and contested probate causes at 
issue will be set for trial only upon writen demand of 
counsel for one of the parties filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
"The demand for setting of a cause for trial shall, 
in addition to such demand, contain the names and ad-
dresses of all counsel of record in the cause, and aver 
that a copy of such demand has been mailed by de-
manding counsel to counsel for each of the parties who 
have appeared in the cause, and shall state whether the 
cause is to be tried by jury or to the court, and shall 
contain a blank to be filled in by the court stating the 
date and hour of the trial. The transmission of such 
copies shall constitute notice to all counsel of the send-
ing of the demand for trial setting, and the court shall 
allow sufficient time after date of demand to permit 
counsel to communicate their preference and recom-
mendation to the court. 
"8. Jury fees may be paid at the time of filing 
the demand for setting, but must be paid within five 
days after the date of making such demand." 
(See ·certified copy of District Court Rules for Assign-
ment and Setting of Cases for Trial filed herein; also De-
mand for Trial Certificate & Order (R. 52) and Notice of 
Trial (R. 53)). It will be noted that the Demand for Trial 
is dated April 29, 1954, Which was filed by the Clerk on Ap-
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ril 30, 1954 (R. 52). Notice of Trial was given on May 7, 
1954 (Tr. 53). The Demand for a Jury is dated June 26, 
1954, and was filed on June 28, 1954 (R. 57). On January 
12, 1953, the Harry Parsley corporation executed and de-
livered to tJhe plaintiff a Note together with a Chattel Mort-
gage on its equipment, machinery, parts, stock in trade, 
furniture, fixtures and personal property at 1150 North 
5th West Street in Provo, Utah (R. 33-38). It also assigned 
to the plaintiff its accounts receivable (Tr. 62). Mr. Calder 
testified that the mortgage was taken hy the plaintiff to 
prevent a dissipation of the assets of the Parsley corpora-
tion and to protect the bank in the event the bank had diffi-
culty in collecting the drafts or eventual payment of the 
drafts (Tr. 62). The trial court so found (R. 70). A:t the 
time of the execution of the above mentioned instruments, 
the plaintiff returned to the Parsley co:vporation four drafts 
and contracts in the total sum orf $3554.27 (Tr. 20). It was 
so found by the trial court, and such finding is not attacked 
(R. 70). These four drafts and contracts were for the sale 
of automobiles by the Parsley corporation to individual pur-
chasers. Defendant characterizes these items as retail 
(Tr. 250). The Parsley rcorparation conveyed the four eon-
tracts to the defendant corporation, which gave the Pars-
ley corporation credit on its account for the same (Tr. 250 
and 255-6). 
A short time after the transactions above mentioned 
were had the defendant corporation and others. threw the 
Parsley corporation inrto involuntary bankruptcy. It is so 
alleged in the Amended Complaint (R. 18) and admitted in 
the defendant's answer (R. 21) and also in the brief of the 
defendants filed herein, on page 4 thereof. 
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While we !:lave not attempted to include all of the evi-
dence offered and received at the trial in the foregoing sum-
mary, we believe that the evidence heretofore summarized 
is all that need be considered in reaching a proper conclu-
sion as to the judgment that should be rendered. 
It will be noted that the appellant corporation has dis-
cussed its claim why the judgment appealed from should 
be reversed under seven headings or poh1ts, together with 
its conclusions under Point 8. We shall discuss the Points 
relied upon in the order set out in appellant's brief, and then 
diseuss the Point which respondent raises in its cross-ap-
peal. 
While we believe there is ample evidence to support a 
judgment against the personal defendants because of fraud 
perpetrated upon the plaintiff as alleged in the Amended 
Complaint, we shall not urge that the trial court erred in 
such particular because this being an action at law, we en-
tertain some doubt as to whether or not plaintiff is entitled 
to such relief. The plaintiff, however, does claim that the 
trial court was in error as a matter of law in refusing to 
grant the plaintiff judgment against the defendant corpo-
ration for the full amount of its claim. By its cross-appeal, 
plaintiff contends: 
POINT ONE A 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT 
PAJRT O·F ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 WHERE 
IT CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT OF THE FOUR 
DRAFTS IN THE SUM OF $3554.27 SHOULD BE DE-
DUC·TED FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT 
TO WHICH THlE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED AND IN 
FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
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PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT CO~R­
PORATIO·N FOR THE SUM OF $21,431.08, TOGETHER 
WITHl INTEREST THEREON AT THE RATE O·F 6% 
PER ANNUM FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 8, 1953. 
POrNT ONE 
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO A 
TRIAL BY JURY. 
Arti·cle I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution of Utah, in part, 
provides: 
"A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless de-
manded.'' 
Rule 38(d), Utah Ruies of Civil Procedure, provides 
that: 
"the failure to demand a trial by jury in conformity 
with Rule 38 constitutes a waiver of the right to a trial 
by jury." 
It will be noted that the defendants failed to make a 
demand for a jury trial as required by the rules of the Dis-
triet Court of Utah County, a certified copy of whieh is filed 
herein, and therefore a jury trial was waived. 
In passing upon the effect of the above provision of the 
Constitution, this Court held in the case of Salt Lake City 
v. West, 55 Utah 357, 186 Pac. 114, that where an applica-
tion for a jury trial was not timely filed, and no excuses 
were alleged or shown explaining such failure, there was 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the Court in denying 
the belated request. To the same effect see Nichols v Che-
ny, 22 Ut. 1, 60 Pac. 1103; Gibson v. MeGWTin, 37 Ut. 158; 
106 Pac. 669; Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Ut. 331; 153 Pac. 
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(2d) 665, 667. So also is it the established law in rthis· juris-
diction that where the facts undisputably establish no right 
to relief, the reversal by the Supreme Court of a judgment 
entered on a verdict in f.avor of the ·plaintiff does not de-
prive the plaintiff of his constitutionally guaranteed right 
to a trial by jury. Creamer v. Ogden Union Railway and 
Depot Co., . Utah , 242 Pac. (2d) 575. 
Not only did the defendants fail to make a timely de-
mand for a jury trial, but as we shall presently point out, 
the undisputed facts in this case entitled the plaintiff to a 
judgment as a matter of law, for the amount prayed for by 
it, and therefore, under the doctrine of Creamer v. Ogden 
Union Railway and Deport Company, the defendants may 
not be heard to eomplain because they were denied a jury 
trial. 
POINT TWO 
THE OON~ACTS HERE SUED UPON ARE NOT 
WHOLESALE CONTR.A!CTS WITHIN THE DEFINITION 
OF SUCH CONTRACTS GIVEN BY FRAN1CIS J. NICH-
OLS AC·CO'RDING TO THE TESTIMONY OF J. HAMIL-
TON CALDER (TR. 14) AND THE FINDING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT (R. 66) AND EVEN IF THEY WERE 
WHOLESALE C01NTRACTS, THE DEFENDANT COR-
PORATIO·N HAS NO CAUS·E FOR COMPLAINT BE-
C.A!USE IT WILL SUFFER NO DAMAGE IF IT REIM-
BURSES THE PLAINTIFF THE MONEY TO WHICH IT 
IS NOT ENTITLED. 
It is asserted in defendant's brief that without the pos-
sibility of a doubt, the transactions represented by items 
marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, Hand I are wholesale 
items. It is true that a number of defendants' witnesses 
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so testified. However, an examination of the authorities 
defining what is a wholesale and what is a retail transac-
tion is not so easy of solution as eounsel would have the 
Court believe. 
It will be noted that each of the above enumerated 
transactions involve but one automobile. It is apparently 
the contention of counsel for defendant that a wholesale 
transaction does not provide for a sales tax (Tr. 91). It 
will be seen that the invoice contained in the transaction I, 
the largest transaction involved in this controversy, pro-
vides for a sales tax of $3.50. 
Apparently the transaction represented by Exhibit F 
was for an automobile to be used as a demonstrator. That 
is also true of the transaction represented by E~hi:bit E, D, 
B, C, F, and A. It is difficult to tell from Exhibit G just 
what was to be done with that automobile. There appears 
a statement contained in that envelope "As We Paid it Off." 
The meaning of the word wholesale, wholesale sales is 
discussed at length in Vol. 45, pages 107 to 116, of the per-
manent Edition of Words and Phrases, where numerous 
cases are cited. We cite only a few of such cases: 
"The primary and usual meaning of the word 
wholesale is the sale of goods in gross to retailers who 
sell to consumers. State v. Spencer, 53 So. 596; 597; 
127 La 336. The term wholesale is the selling by un-
broken parcels as distinguished from retail or dividing 
into smaller quantities and selling direct to consumers. 
Cont'l Banking Co. v. Campbell, 53 Pac. (2d) 114, 116; 
176 Okla 218. The sale of liquors from time to time in 
six or ten gallon kegs of different kinds cannot be called 
selling by wholesale. Gossult v. Gutterfield, 2 Wise. 
237; 242. Where tangible personalty is sold fior pur-
chaser's use or ~consumption and not for resale in sub-
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stantially the same condition as purchased, there is a 
retail sale within the terms of Retail Sales ':Vax Act, 
rather than a wholesale sale and aside from specific 
statutory exceptions or exemptions, the real test is ex-
istence of sale to one who uses or consumes the prop-
erty irrespective of whether property is used in pur-
chaser's place of business or in his home. Warren v. 
Funk, 72 Pac (2d) 968; 146 Kan. 716." 
If the doctrine announced by the Kansas court in the 
case lqst above cited is to be followed, the fact that an auto-
mobile was to be used by salesmen for purposes of demon-
stration would not make it a wholesale deal, as distinguished 
from a retail deal, quite the contrary. So also the fact that 
Mr. Parsley should personally purchase an automobile from 
the defendant corporation would doubtless no:t make such 
transaction a wholesale deal. 
Burt if it should be construed that Exhibits A to I, both 
inclusive, represent wholesale items, such fact under the 
evidence and the facts as found by the trial court would 
not aid the defendant corporation. Counsel for appellant 
seems to contend that if Mr. Calder was informed on Decem-
ber 24, 1952, that the bank should not give the Parsley cor-
poration any more immediate credit for drafts drawn after 
that, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Even if such 
be the fact there is ample evidence to show that such in-
struction was later rescinded, and all of the sight drafts 
here involved would be or had been honored and would be 
.Paid by the defendant corporation. Not only that, but there 
is ample evidence, and the trial ,court found that in reliance 
upon such promises the plaintiff paid checks in the amount 
of $21,431.08 out of the credit given the Parsley corpora-
tion for the drafts that the defendant corporation refused 
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to honor (R. 68 and 69, paragraphs 11 to 14, both inclusive). 
The attention of the Court is again called to the testi-
mony of Mr. Calder (Tr. 51) and Mr. Bird (Tr. 173-193). 
In this eonnection it is significant that defendant Wilkin-
son, who was then overseeing the ·credits and personnel of 
the defendant corporation's business at Salt Lake and else-
where, according to his own testimony, came to Provo on 
January 7, 1953, and presented some checks to the plaintiff 
bank at Provo, which checks were not paid (Tr. 246) and 
then on the next day, January 8, 1953, Mr. McElhany, a 
vice-president of the defendant corporation with headquar-
ters at Seattle, Washington, flew down to Urtah and showed 
up at the plaintiff bank at Provo wirth 22 or 23 thousand 
dollars in checks drawn by the Parsley corporation in favor 
of the defendant corporation on the plaintiff bank and de-
manded payment of such checks (Tr. 256-258). When pay-
ment was refused, according to his own testimony, McEl-
hany left the bank and talked to Mr. Wilkinson (who had 
returned to Salt Lake) and told Mr. Wilkinson to refuse 
payment of all of the drafts here involved (Tr. 260), not-
withstanding defendants admit that four of said drafts were 
retail drafts. Mter this conversation, Mr. McElhany re-
turned to the bank and again sought to have the plaintiff 
pay the checks which he then had (Tr. 263). Such actions 
on the part of the officers and agents of defendant corpo--
ration cannort well be said to be consistent with fair dealing. 
It tends in no small degree to bear out the testimony of 
Messrs. Calder and Bird that the officers and agents who 
participated in the transactions here involved and brought 
in question were out to get the plaintiff to pay the checks 
held by it out of the credit which the bank had given to the 
Parsley corporation for the drafts that were dishonored by 
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the, defendant corporation. The scheme worked to the ex-
tent thq.t the defendant succeeded in disposing of, at their 
face value, $21,431.08 of checks that were probably worth-
less or nearly so. It is plaintiff's contention that when the 
officers of the defendant corporation assured the plaintiff 
that if it would pay such checks, the drafts would be paid, 
and if in reliance upon such promises the checks were paid, 
the fa:ct that some of the checks may be characterized as 
wholesale drafts does not relieve the defendant corporation 
from the obUgation, even though there were, contrary to our 
contention, instructions on December 24, 1952, that immedi-
ate credit should not have been given for some of the drafts. 
There is no valid reason why the agreement had in Janu-
ary, 1953, is not binding on the defendant corporation mere-
ly because another or different arrangement may have been 
had in December, 1952. 
On page 9, under Point II of appellant's brief, it is said 
that the trial court permitted respondent to be paid twice 
for the four drafts, and that appellant is being compelled 
to pay twice for such drafts. We are unable to follow such 
argument. ':Dhe fact of the matter is that the amount of 
the four drafts was deducted from the $21,431.08 that plain-
tiff was damaged because it was tricked into paying that 
amount of checks out of a credit that had been given to the 
Parsley ·corpor.ation on account of the drafts which defend-
ant corporation, contrary to its promises, repudiated. We 
shall have more to say about this phase of the case in con-
ne,ctio~ with respondent's cross-appeal. 
It is also said on page 9 of appellants' brief that re-
spondent relinquished four of the dmfts to the Parsley cor-
poration against the positive recommendation and desire of 
app~Hant. If the appellant did not wish the drafts released 
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to the Parsley corporation, there was one and only one way 
to prevent such release, namely, to pay the drafts as they 
agreed. We know of no rule of law, and we think none can 
be found, that under the facts disclosed by this record the 
plaintiff was required to follow the recommendation or de-
sires of the appellant. It is also said that appellant paid 
Parsley in full for the four drafts that were returned to 
him. Doubtless the Parsley corporation had a right to sell 
and the appellant the right to purchase said drafts. They 
carried with them a contract for the sale of automobiles, 
and if defendant -corporation parted with ·cash for the con-
tracts represented by the drafts, doubtless the defendant 
corporation deemed the contracts more valuable than the 
cash or it would not have purchased the same. If perchance 
the purchasers of the automobile for which the contract 
and accompanying draft were given fails to pay the amount 
that they agreed to pay, it would seem obvious that the 
plaintiff is not to be penalized on account of such failure. 
POINT THREE 
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM AS TO THE DEFINITI01N 
OF WHAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS WHOLESALE 
AND WHAT RETAIL TRANSACTIONS IS SUPPO·RTED 
BY CREDITABLE EVIDENCE. 
,Under Point Three of appellants' brief, much is said 
about what the writer of the brief claims rto be the frailty 
of the testimony of plaintiff's witness, J. Hamilton Calder. 
At the outset it should be kept in mind that this is an action 
at law, and therefore this Court is, by the State Constitu-
tion, Sec. 9 of Article 8, and by numerous decisions, pre-
cluded from passing on the weight of the evidence. We 
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have heretofore in this brief given a summary of the testi-
mony of Mr. Calder and Mr. Bird, and no useful purpose 
will be served by again going over such testimony. Suffice 
it to say that such evidence is not only substantial, but, we 
submit, bespeaks verity. It is true rthat the evidence shows 
that Mr. ·Calder has all of the qualifications enumerated on 
page 10 of appellants' brief, and that the evidence shows 
that Mr. Nichols is not without experience in financial mat-
ters. Nor do we contend that there is not ample evidence 
to justify the conclusion that geneTally one cannot deter-
mine without more examination of the drafts involved in 
this controversy whether the same represents a retail or a 
wholesale transaction. As we have heTetofore pointed out, 
it is doubtful whether an examination of the contents of the 
envelopes upon whi~ch the drafts were written would reveal 
with any degree of certainty whether the transactions rep-
resented by the drafts were wholesale or retail. A reading 
of the authorities heretofore cited shows that the courts of 
last resort are not agreed as to what is and what is not a 
whoJesale transaction. We venture the prediction that if 
the average man in the street were asked the question of 
whether the sale of one automobile such as those represen-
ted by the various transactions here involved constituted 
a wholesale or a retail transaction, he would unhesitatingly 
say· it was a retail transaction. 
On page 18 of appellants' brief, we find a discourse 
about the kiting of checks and a statement that the plain-
tiff was under a duty to inform defendant corporation of 
the kiting of checks. We are not cited to any case holding 
that any such duty existed, and in the absence of any agree-
ment to that effect, we doubt that any such case can be 
found. No one connected with the defendant corporation 
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ever requested the plaintiff to keep the defendant corpora-
tion informed as to the financial ·condition of the Parsley 
corporation (Tr. 122). Moreover, it is the duty of a bank 
rmd, so far as we are advised, the uniform practice of banks 
and bankers to refrain from informing others of the busi-
ness of their customers. Indeed, if a bank or banker should 
volunteer such information and it should prove false, the 
bank or banker may well be required to respond in damages 
in so doing. Further as to that, the evidence shows that 
Mr. Parsley gave to Mr. Calder a satisfactory explanation 
of the check kiting incident, and when he was asked as to 
the explanation counsel for the defendants objected to such 
explanation, and the objection was sustained (Tr. 131). 
Appellants seem to get some comfort out of the fact 
that the Parsley corporation had at times only a small 
amount in its account. Just what is ·claimed for such fact 
is not made to appear. Attention is also called to appel-
lants' Exhibit Q, and the statement is made, contrary to 
all of the evidence, that such exhibit shows almost contin-
uous overdrafts in large amounts. The statement, when 
viewed in the light of Mr. Calder's testimony, shows that 
immediate ·credit was given to the Parsley ·covporation for 
sight drafts drawn on the defendant covporation. Such 
practice was admittedly done pursuant to an agreement with 
the defendant corporation. What counsel for defendant 
characterizes as an overdraft was not such, but conSisted 
of ·checks drawn against an account which contained credits 
for dmfts or other items whi·ch were deposited to the Pars-
ley account, but had not yet cleared. That is to say, credit 
had not been given the plaintiff (Tr. 137). Mr. Calder tes-
tified that the bank had never paid any overdraft of the 
Parsley corporation unless it be said that to give credit for 
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an nncollected draft or check constituted an overdraft (Tr. 
139-140). 
Again on page 19 of appellants' brief, attention is called 
to the fact that Calder owned a one-half interest in a build-
ing that was being leased by the Parsley -corporation. Here 
again we are at a loss to know just what such fact has to 
do with this litigation. Obviously the defendant corporation 
may nort be relieved from performing its undertakings with 
the plaintiff because its cashier- ·was interested in a lease 
of property to the Parsley -corporation. 
On pages 20 to 23 of appellants' brief, counsel for ap-
pellants again reverts to the matter of wholesale and retail 
drafts, among other things ·claiming that Calder is not wor-
thy of belief because he was unable to accurately read the 
photostatic cop,ies of some of the sight drafts here involved. 
We suggest that the members of the Court attempt to read 
such· photostatic copies and see if they can do a better job 
than did Mr. ~Calder. The faot that one may not have per-
fect eyesight cannot well be said to affect his credibility 
about matters where eyesight is not involved. It will be 
noted that later in the trial, plaintiff was able to get the 
original checks from which the photostatic copies were ta-
ken. Such original checks were received in evidence, and 
probably no one will find any difficulty in reading such 
checks. No complaint is made that the Findings of Fact 
fail to reflect the correet amount of the checks drawn by 
the Parsley corporation in favor of the defendant corpora-
tion and paid out of the ~credit given Parsley for the sight 
drafts that defendant corporation refused to pay. 
If the plaintiff or its officers should have opened the 
envelopes containing the sight draft-s, such act would have 
been contrary to the implied if· not expressed direction on 
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the envelope, namely, the language "Please seal this enve-
lope". In the conversation had with Mr. Nichols on De-
cember 24, 1952, according to his testimony, Mr. Calder 
asked how he eould distinguish "an item of wholesale and 
an item of retail and my reply was that normally items of 
wholesale would be in larger amounts than retail. How-
ever the only way that you could actually ten whether it 
was wholesale or retail was to open the drraft", to which 
Mr. Calder replied that he didn't know if he should. Mr. 
Wilkinson testified that it was not the .custom of bankers 
to open envelopes upon which drafts were written (Tr. 255). 
We have probably devoted more space than necessary 
in answer to appellants' Point 3- because in our view the 
matters there urged by appellants are ·more or less aca-
demic. In our view, it is not of -controlling importan-ce 
whether the drafts here involved were wholesale or retail, 
or whether the bank officials should or should not have 
opened the envelopes upon which the drafts -were written. 
Suppose the employees of the bank had opened the enve-
lopes upon which the drafts were written and concluded 
that the drafts represented a wholesale transaction and 
therefore the Parsley corporation should not be and was not 
given credit therefor. Obviously, the result would have 
been that the bank would not have paid the checks in the 
sum of $21,431.08, and the defendant corporation would be 
holding that amount of worthless ·checks instead of being 
obligated to repay to the plaintiff that amount on account 
of such checks having been mistakenly paid. If the defend-
ant ·corporation pays to the plaintiff the sum of $21,431.08, 
it will be in the same position financially that it would have 
been in if payment of such checks had been refused. More-
over, if as the ~court found in its Findings 11, 12, 13 and 14, 
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the defendant corporation, acting through its agent and 
officers assured the plaintiff that the sight drafts here in-
volved would be or had been ordered paid, and in reliance 
upon such assurance the . plaintiff paid the checks of the 
P'arsley corporation in the amount of $21,431.08, what pos-
sible difference ·could it make whether the drafts for which 
credit was given were wholesale or retail? Unless the ap-
pellants can successfully defeat Findings Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 
14 of the trial eourt, the matter of the kind of drafts is of 
no avail. The original agreement to honor all sight drafts 
drawn by the Parsley corporation, prior to December 24·, 
1952., is not questioned. According to plaintiff's evidence, 
the same kind of an arrangement was had with respect to 
the drafts here involved immediately before the bank paid 
the checks which were drawn against the credit given to 
the Parsley corporation for the sight drafts which were dis-
honored. 
POINT FOUR 
THE AGREEMENTS TO HONO·R WHOLESALE 
DRAFTS AFTER DECEMBER 24, 1952, ARE NOT WITH-
IN THIE STATUTE' OF FRAUD'S. 
. Under this point, ~cotmsel for appellants directs the 
attention of the Court to Defendant's Exhibit 4, a memo-
randum of Mr. Calder, and particularly to the ·language of 
paragraph 5, wherein it is recited that "On January 7 Mr. 
McConnell and Mr. Sperry -called at the bank regarding 
-checks they were ho~ding on Harry Parsley, Inc. They as-
sured us that they would accept retail draf·ts in process of 
clearance, but would pay no further drafts signed by Mr. 
Parsley." They fail to mention the following language of 
that Exhibit: "On January 7th Mr. Wilkinson, regional 
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auditor for Universal C. I. T., talked to Mr. Bird about Harry 
Parsley drafts accepted by us for immediate credit. He 
said he had noticed a large number of drafts totalling $29·,-
223.65 in Salt Lake City offices and that he had authorized 
them paid." These were the drafts on which Universal C. 
I. T. subsequently refused payment. It should be noted that 
Mr. Sperry and Mr. McConnell called at the bank on Janu-
ary 7th about 10:00 o'clock A. M. (Tr. 226-173). They 
did not know the nature of the drafts here involved (Tr. 
216-218-230). They said the drafts would be paid (Tr. 181). 
Mr. Wilkinson eame to the plaintiff bank at Provo after 
closing hours, that is about 4:30 o'elock P. M. (Tr. 246-176). 
Mr. Bird testified that Mr. Sperry and Mr. Nichols stated 
that the drafts in question would be paid, and that Mr. Wil-
kinson, when he eame in after banking hours on January 
7, 1953, stated that he had noticed a number of drafts in 
his office on the morning of January 7, 1953, and had or-
dered the same paid. That these were the drafts here in-
volved (Tr. 176-177). At that time the plaintiff could have 
refused payment of the checks drawn against the drafts 
(Tr. 193). Under Point Four appellants further contend 
that any arrangement had after December 24, 1952, with 
respeet to the payment of drafts was void under the pro• 
visions of U. C. A. 1953, 25-5-4, subdivision 2 thereof. It 
is there provided: 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged ~therewith: 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another." 
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Such provision of the statute has no application to the 
facts in this case ~beoause (1) The promise here sued upon 
is the agreement had with the defendant corporation; (2) 
The agreement sued upon has been performed by the plain-
tiff, and hence the statute relied upon has no application. 
The contract alleged and established by the evidence 
was between the plaintiff and defendant corporation. It 
was in no sense cotlateral to any agreement between the 
bank and the Parsley ·corporation. There is no evidence 
which even remotely justifies the conclusion that the de-
fendant corporation would pay the sight drafts if the Pars-
ley corporation failed or refused to do so. The law in such 
particular is illustrated by such eases as Wahl v. Cunning-
ham, 320 Mo. 57; 6 S. W. (2d) 576; 67 A.L.R. 489. The 
question of when a promise is within and when without the 
Statute of Frauds is discussed at some length in 49 Am. Jur. 
416 et seq and cases cited in foot notes. So also 37 C.J.S. 
521, Sec. 14 and oases cited in foot notes. The Court will 
doubtless not Wish to read all of the eases there cited. 
Among the cases which illustrate the rule are Kelly v. 
Greenough, 9 Was·h. 659; 38 Pac. 158, where it is held that 
where defendant authorized B to draw certain orders which 
he agreed to pay and after such orders were drawn told 
plaintiff that if they would purchase then he would after-
wards accept and pay them and plaintiff purchased some 
of such orders, defendant cannot successfully set up the 
statute of frauds. To the same effect is Nelson v. First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago, 48 Ill. 36; Landsdale v. Lafayette 
Bank, 18 Ohio 213; Bessell v. Lewis, 4 Mieh. 450. We have 
found no case where a different doctrine has ~been an-
nounced. 
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It is the established law in this jurisdi-ction that when 
a contract which is within the statute of frauds has been 
fully executed, the statute of frauds has no application. 
Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 ,Ut. 364; 170 Pac. 981; Greenwood v. 
Jackson, 102 Ut. 161; 128 Pac. (2d) 282; Bamberger Co. v. 
Certified Production Inc., 88 Ut. 194; 201; 48 Pac. (2d) 489. 
Utah has a statute, U.C.A. 1953, 25-5-6, whieh pro¥ides that: 
"A promise to answer for the obligation of another 
in any of the following cases is deemed an original ob-
ligation of the promisor and need not be in writing: 
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters 
into an obligation in consideration of the obligation in 
respect to whi-ch the promise is made in terms or under 
circumstances such as to render the party making the 
promise the principal debtor and the person in whose 
behalf it is made his surety." 
In this case the plaintiff has fully performed its obli-
gation, namely, has given the defendant immediate credit 
for the sight drafts and has paid checks to the extent of 
$21,431.08. 
Independent of statute, it is the well established law as 
stated in 49 Am. Jur. 725, Section 421, that: 
"The true basis of the doctrine of part perform-
ance according to the overwhelming weight of author-
ity, is that it would be a fraud upon the plaintiff if the 
defendant were permitted to escape performance of 
his part of the oral agreement after he has permitted 
the plaintiff to perform in reliance upon the agreement. 
The oral contract is enforced in harmony with the prin-
ciple that courts of equity will not allow the statute of 
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. In other 
words, the doctrine of part performance was estab-
lished for the same purpose for which the statute of 
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frauds itself was enacted, namely, for the prevention 
of fraud, and arose from the necessity of preventing 
the statute from becoming an agent of fraud, for it 
could not have been the intention of the statute to en-
able any party to commit a fraud with impunity." 
Numerous cases from state and federal courts will be 
found in foot notes in support of and which do support the 
text, among whi:ch is the case of Price v. lloyd, 31 Utah 
86; Other Uta:h cases where the above doctrine is applied 
are: Brinton v. VanCott, 8 Ut. 480; 33 Pac. 218; Lynch v. 
Coviglio, 17 Ut. 106; 53 Pac. 983; Van Natta v. Heywood, 
57 Ut. 376; 195 Pa:c. 192. 
Applying the doctrine of the. foregoing authorities to 
the case at hand, it is apparent that the plaintiff will sus-
tain a loss of $21,413.08 if the defendant corpoTation is· re-
lieved from performing its part of the contract here brought 
in question unless perchance the plaintiff can recover some 
part thereof from the insolvent Parsley corporation. 
But suppose the contract is void, such fact would not, 
under the authorities, enable the defendant .-corporation to 
retain the fruits of such contract and escape its burdens. 
If a contract is void, it is void for all purposes. Such a so-
called contract may not be said to be valid for the purpose 
of enabling one party to retain the benefits thereof at the 
expense of the other party thereto. The authorities, as we 
read them, are all to that effect, where as here the party 
invoking the statute of frauds seeks to retain the benefitS 
which are a loss by the other party to the transaction. The 
doctrine is illustrated by oral contracts for the sale of real 
estate. The law is thus stated in 49 Am. Jur. 872, Sec. 566: 
"It is well established that where a vendee enters 
on premises under an oral contract for the purchase 
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of such premises and the vendor thereafter repudiates 
the eontraot and refuses to convey the land, asserting 
the bar of the statute of frauds, the vendee is entitled 
to recover, in addition to the purchase money paid by 
him, the value of the i~mprovements made by him on 
the premises while in possession under the parol eon-
tract, to the ,extent, at least, that they have enhanced 
the value of the land.'' 
So here the defendant corporation having secured the 
payment of the Parsley corporation checks out of the im-
mediate credit given that corporation by the plaintiff for 
the repudiated sight drafts, may not retain the benefits of 
such a transaction under the claim that the agreement by 
which such a benefit was conferred upon the defendant cor-
poration was void because not in writing. 
POiNT FIVE 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE 
AMOUNT OF CHECKS THAT WERE PAID BECAUSE 
OF A MISTAKE OF FACT, IF THERE WERE SUCH A 
MISTAKE. 
Under appellants' Point Five, it is argu~ that the 
plaintiff is not only chargeable with knowledge of whether 
the sight drafts contained on the outside of the envelopes 
were for retail or wholesale transactions, but also with the 
knowledge of all of the contents of such envelopes. As we 
understand appellants' position, it is that in no event may 
the plaintiff ibe eX!cused for the mistake of its officers and 
employees, and the defendant corporation is entitled to en-
rich itself to the extent of $21,413.08, because the plain-
tiff or its officers .made a mistake of fact. . The authorities, 
as we read them, do not support any such doctrine, but are 
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contrary thereto. On page 30 of appellants' brief, a number 
of cases and authorities are cited which it is claimed sup-
port appellants' contention. We shall not undertake tore-
view in detail the eases and authorities there cited, but if 
and when the Court examines the same, we believe it will 
find no difficulty in concluding that they do not apply to 
the facts in this ease. On page 29 of appellants' brief there 
is a quotation from Williston on Contracts and from Michie, 
Banks and Banking, to the effect that if a bank on which a 
check is drawn pays the same by mistake, it may not be 
heard to say that there were not sufficient funds with which 
to pay the same. No such a situation is here presented. 
In this ease the evidence shows, and the court found, that 
there were sufficient credits in the account of the Parsley 
corporation to pay the checks that were paid. The sole 
cause of the difficulty in which plaintiff finds itself is in the 
fact that the defendant corporation refused to pay the sight 
drafts in violation of its assurance that the sight drafts had 
been or would be paid if the plaintiff would pay the checks 
which had theretofore been presented for payment. 
To the same effect is the law stated in 7 Am. Jur. 443, 
9 C.J.S. 772; 2 Morse, Banks and Banking 6th Ed. 1001; 
7 Zollman, Banks and Banking and the American Law In-
stitute Restatement of the Law of Restitution. No differ-
ent doctrine is announced in the cited cases. The plaintiff 
did not make a mistake as to the amount of credit in the 
Parsley corporation account when it paid the checks. The 
mistake the plaintiff did make was in relying on the pro-
mises of the offi,cers and agents of the defendant corpora-
tion that the sight drafts which it held would be paid. 
On page 30 of appellants' brief, it is said that it was 
hot in good taste for the respondent to charge in its plead-
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ings that the appellant or its agents were guilty of fraud 
in connection with the transactions here brought in ques-
tion. In light of these facts: that on January 7, 1953, at 
10:00 o'clock A.M. Mr. Nichols and Mr. Sperry appeared 
at plaintiff's hank at Provo and assured it the drafts in 
process of clearance would be paid (Tr. 54); that on the 
same day at about 4:30 P.M. Mr. Wilkinson showed up at 
the plaintiff bank and stated to Mr. Bird that he had no-
ticed a number of drafts, meaning the drafts in question, 
at the office in Salt Lake and that he ordered the same paid 
(Tr. 176-7), and that on the next day, Mr. McElhany showed 
up at the bank with about 22 or 23 thousand dollars worth 
of ehecks and demanded that the same be paid, and upon 
payment being refused, he inquired if the bank knew what 
would happen to the drafts which defendant company held 
if the checks presented by Mr. McElhany were not paid, 
and then left the bank and called up Mr. Wilkinson and di-
rected the drafts be returned to the bank. Then having 
directed that the drafts be not paid, again returned to the 
plaintiff bank and demanded payment of the checks, we con-
fess that we know of no language that more accurately 
characterized defendants' actions than that contained in 
plaintiffs' pleadings filed herein. 
We quote the following from some of the authorities 
·cited by appellants: 
"The general rule is that money paid under a mis-
take of fact may be recovered, but a mistake in regard 
to the amount of a customer's deposit is not such a mis-
take of fact as entitles a bank paying a check to re-
cover back the amount from the payee." Mi-chie on 
Bank and Banking, Vlol 5a, page 546, See also the same 
Volume Sec. 230. 
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In 70 C.J.S., page 371, the law is thus stated: 
"It is generally held that the failure of the payor 
to exercise ordinary care to avoid the mistake under 
whi1ch he made the payment sought to be recovered will 
nat, as a matter of law, defeat his recovery and that 
negligence of the payor in failing to discoveP the facts 
will not prevent recovery when the payment was ac-
tually made under a mistake of fact unless the payee 
has changed his position in reliance on the payment." 
Citation of a few of the cases will show the trend of 
judicial authority: 
In the case of Aebli v. Board of Education of City and 
.,. 
County of San Francisco, 145 Pac. (2d) 501; 62 Cal . .App. 
(2d) 706, it is held that if money is paid by mistake of fact, 
it may be recovered back no matter how negligent the party 
making the payment may have been unless the payment has 
caused such change in position of the other party that it 
would be unjust to require him to refund. ._ 
In the ease of Smith v. Rubel, 13 Pac. (2d) 1078; 140 
Ore. 42.2, it is held that: 
"Generally payment under mistake of fact which 
induces erroneous belief that payee is entitled to money 
may be recovered provided change in position does not 
make recovery inequitable. Payor's negligence will not 
defeat recovery in action for money had and received, 
absent ·change of condition making recovery inequi-
table." 
The foregoing doctrine is approved by this Court in the 
case of Riskey v. Clark, 11 Utah 467; 40 Pac. 717. 
By directing the attention of the Court to the effect 
of negligence, we do not wish to be understood as con-
ceding that the plaintiff or its agents were negligent in this 
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case, especially in light of the fact that the agents and offi-
cers of the defendant corporation assured the plaintiff's 
officers that the drafts would be paid and that at a time 
when, except for such assurances, the checks would not 
have been paid. 
POINT SIX 
THE OBLIGATION DUE THE RESPONDENT BY 
THE APPELLANTS WAS NOT PAID OR DISCHARGED 
UPON THE EXECUTION OF THE PARSLEY MORT-
GAGE TO RESPONDENT. 
The law is well settled that the taking of a note and 
mortgage does not constitute a payment of an obligation 
in the absence of an agreement to that effect. 40 Am. Jur. 
page 775·, Sec. 87. In this case the evidence is all to the 
efifect that the note and mortgage together with an assign-
ment of the accounts receivable were taken to prevent the 
dissipation of the assets of the Parsley eorporation and to 
protect the bank and other ·creditors (Tr. 62. The trial 
court so held. R. 70). Moreover the defendant, by assist-
ing in throwing the Parsley corporation into bankruptcy, 
saw to it that the plaintiff can not receive the money ow-
ing to it from any money that may be secured from the 
payment of the note and mortgage or the accounts receiv-
able assigned to the plaintiff for collection. 
It is, of course, the well settled law that the filing of a 
petition in bankruptcy is an assertion of the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court over all the property and assets of the 
alleged bankrupt with a view to the determination of his 
status and the settlement and distribution of his estate in 
event an adjudication results. 
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Stratton v. New 283 U. S. 318; 75 L. Ed. 1060; Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Tramley, 260 N.Y. 280; 183 N.E. 
425; In re Mitchell, 38 F (2d) 283. So also does the filing 
of a petition in bankruptcy operate to bring bank accounts 
owing to the alleged bankrupt within the legal custody and 
control of the bankruptcy court. In re Zemmern1an, 66 F 
(2d) 397. 
In this case the defendant corporation seeks to enri·ch 
itself to the extent of $21,413.08 and then in an effort to 
forestall the plaintiff from recovery of its loss by means of 
having the Parsley co:vporation declared a bankrupt. To 
conclude that such a process constitutes a payment of an 
obligation is wholly without support in law or equity. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE RESPO~NDENT HAS NOT, BY TAKING THE 
NOTE AND MORTGAGE, ELE·CTED TO FORE.GO ITS 
RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION. 
Much of what has been said under Point Six is applicable 
to Point Seven. It is a matter of common procedure for 
one who has a several cause of action against two or more 
persons to proceed against them in separate proceedings. 
Indeed the fact that an action is several means that sep-
ara te actions or proceedings may be brought against them. 
The Parsley corporation was not a party to the agreement 
whereby the defendant ~corporation agreed to pay the sight 
drafts here involved if the plaintiff would pay the checks 
which had been presented by defendant corporation for·pay-
ment. That was the sole undertaking of the defendant cor-
poration. .The mere fact that plaintiff sought to collect 
the ~money from the Parsley corporation does not relieve the 
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defendant from its obligation. Of eourse, if the plaintiff 
had succeeded in collecting the money owing to it from the 
Parsley corporation, it could not again collect from the de-
fendant corporation. Contrary to the statement of counsel 
for the defendant on page 37 of its brief, plaintiff has not 
collected one cent on the note and mortgage, and if it had 
such money, it would be subject to the control and disposi-
tion of the bankruptcy court. The fact that appellant was 
or was not a surety of Parsley would not change the results. 
See U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2, 15-4-3 and 15-4-4. 
It would be a strange doctrine to hold that the defend-
ant corporation is relieved from its obligation to pay be-
cause the plaintiff took a note and mortgage from the Pars-
ley corporation which was rendered uncollectable by rea-
son of the defendant corporation succeeding in having the 
Parsley corporation thrown into bankruptcy. 
POINT ONE A 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT 
PART OF ITS CON·CLUSlON OF LAW NO. 1 WHE·RE 
IT CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT O~F THE FOUR 
DRAFTS IN THE SUM OF $3554.27 SHOULD BE DE-
DUCTED FROM THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT 
TO WHICH THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED AND IN 
FAILING TO ENTER J,UDGMENT IN FAV10R OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT COR-
PORATION FOR THE SUM OF $21,431.08, TOGETHER 
Wl'I'Hj INTEREST THERE01N AT THE RATE o~F 6% 
PER ANNUM FROM AND AFTER JANUARY 8, 1953. 
The plaintiff has cross-appealed from a part of the 
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judgment rendered in this cause. The trial court found in 
its Finding numbered 23 (R. 72): 
"That as a proximate and direct result of the fail-
ure of the defendant corporation to pay the above men-
tioned drafts, the plaintiff has sustained a loss of $21,-
431.08, together with interest thereon from and after 
January 8, 1953., at 6% per annum." 
. The evidence is all to the effect that such loss was sus-
tained by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the findings and 
evidence establish that such loss was sustained, the court 
deducted therefrom the sum of $3554.27, that being the 
amount of four sight drafts. These sight drafts represen-
ted transactions which were accompariied by contracts for 
th~ sale -of four automobiles to the purchaser of the same. 
T~e defendant corporation concedes. these were retail tran-
sactions and that ·as such it was obliated to pay the drafts. 
It did not do so, and as a result the plaintiff is out that sum 
of money. Defendant corporation seems to contend that 
it is not obligated to pay that amount because the plaintiff 
conveyed its interest in the contracts for the sale of the 
automobiles to the Parsley corporation and took a note and 
mortgage from the Parsley ·corporation, which note and 
mortgage included the value of the contracts for the sale 
of the four .automobiles. Defendant corporation also seems 
to contend that because it secured the contracts for the sale 
of the four automobiles from the· Parsley corporation and 
credited its account with the· same, that therefore, the de-
fendant corporation should be relieved from paying its obli-
gation to the ·plaintiff. · The court should not have any dif-
ficulrty in di~sposing of· this latter eontention. ·Obviously the 
defendant· corporation could not pay off its· obligation to the 
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plaintiff by a transaction had with the Parsley corporation 
to which the plaintiff was not a party, and so far as appears 
was without knowledge that such a transaction was had. 
It may be that the trial court believed that the plaintiff 
could recover the $3554.27 in the bankruptcy proceedings 
because the plaintiff acquired no preference as to thart 
amount ~because the estate of the bankrupt was increased 
in that amount by surrender of the contracts for the sale of 
the automobiles. It may or may nort be that the $3554.27 
can be recovered in the bankruptcy proceeding. The rec-
ord is silent as to the amount that is owing by the Parsley 
corporation, or the amount of the assets that may be re-
quired to satisfy preferred claims. Be that as it may, even 
if there will be sufficient funds available to pay the $3-554.27 
to the plaintiff, such fact does not relieve the defendant cor-
poration from i~ts obligations. As we have heretofore poin-
ted out in this brief, the plaintiff may pursue its claim sep-
arately against all who are liable for the payment of the 
loss of $21,431.08, which it sustained by reason of the tran-
sactions here involved. When and only when the plaintiff 
is actually paid all or part of its loss is any party liable 
for the payment thereof released from its obligation to pay 
the same, and then only to the extent of the amount so 
paid. It is so provided by U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2 and 15-4-3. 
This latter section is construed in the case of ·Green v. Lang 
Co., 206 Pac (2d) 626. 
If a judgment had been obtained against the Parsley 
corporation for plaintiff's claim, such fact would not under 
the expressed language of U.C.A. 1953, 15-4-2, have dis-
charged the defendant herein. That being so, one of the 
steps taken to accomplish such a result would not relieve 
the defendant corporation to pay the full amount of dam-
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ages sustained by the plaintiff. It is submitted that plain-
tiff is entitled . to a judgment for the amount of its loss, 
namely, $21,413.08,. togethe·r with interest on $19,646.64 
and costs incurred in the trial court in the sum of $29.40 at 
8% per annum from and after August 31, 1954, the date of 
the judgment, and for the additional sum of $3554.27, to-
gether with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum 
from and after January 8, 1953, and for .costs incurred on 
this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MO~RGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
and Cross-appellant 
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